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Is forcing Catholic opponents of abortion to pay taxes for abortion coverage in health 
plans the same as forcing pacifists to fight?  The answer, we’ll see is, is ‘no’, because of the 
nature of abortion, taxation, and democratic government.   We will then examine the 
implications of these claims for the role of religious bodies in the provision of public 
services.  
                            --------------------------------------- 
War, Abortion and Conscience 
Pacifism, as generally understood, is the moral belief that no war is morally 
justifiable.3  Hence, the rationale for allowing pacifists to serve their country some way 
other than fighting reflects the fact that pacifists will often be willing and able to help 
their country in wartime, as long as they need not fight.  Instead of throwing pacifists into 
prison and treating them as cowards or traitors, it is fairer and more sensible to allow 
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them to serve in work which is morally urgent, such as care of the sick and wounded, but 
which does not directly contribute to war.    While   pacifists often defend their beliefs 
publicly, they generally accept that their opposition to war and violence gives them no 
special dispensation to broadcast anti-war beliefs, or to avoid taxation.4   
Opponents of abortion are a mixed bag, in that the status is largely a political one, and 
many people who personally believe that all or most abortions are morally wrong may not 
identify themselves as antiabortion.  They may think other moral wrongs are more urgent, 
for example, or they may simply not support – and may even oppose – much of the 
politics and morality of the ‘antiabortion movement’.   
Not all those who object morally to abortion believe that it is murder – some moral 
objections to abortion concern the attitudes of society, or of individuals, to sex, 
reproduction, the status of women – or, indeed, to the way abortion might lead us to 
consider the old, the weak, the disabled, the young.  Moreover, people who believe that 
abortion is murder sometimes accept that theirs is not the last word on morality, and that 
it would be as wrong to turn their views of abortion into law, given the nature of the 
abortion decision, as it would be to mandate their particular style of worship or belief, 
given the nature of religious belief and worship. 5 While Catholic bishops claim to speak on 
behalf of all those who object morally to abortion, they may represent at best a small 
fraction of those who believe abortion to be morally wrong, or even, murder.  
 
Moral opposition to abortion, therefore, implies no duty to deny the legitimacy of laws 
allowing abortion, or to seek to overturn, or to exempt oneself from, taxes which help to 
secure safe abortions for all women who want them.  This is a point that Mario Cuomo 
made repeatedly and powerfully. 6  We should therefore be wary of confusing the political 
claims of some people opposed to abortion with what is entailed by the belief that 
abortion is morally wrong, even murder.  
 
So much for the preliminaries about pacifism and opposition to abortion.  What does 
this imply about the ethics of tax exemptions and other religiously based political 
objections to Obama’s healthcare reforms?   
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Ethics and Tax Exemptions 
 
First, the belief that abortion is murder does not itself entail that legalised abortion is 
unjust.  People who oppose abortion can accept that, as with religious differences, 
informed, upstanding and conscientious people can reach different conclusions about the 
morality of abortion, and that the consequences of these differences for people’s lives 
preclude the use of state power to forbid or mandate abortion.7  
 
 Second, there is nothing inherently unjust in general taxation to secure medically safe 
abortions, given its importance to fair access to an important legal right, and its 
implications for the freedom, equality, life and health of women.8  Not all conscientious 
objections to abortion are consistent with democratic principles, or with the moral claims 
of women and the conscientious dimensions of the decision to terminate, rather than 
continue, a pregnancy.   Those that are recognise that democratic principles mean that 
people can be legitimately required to accept policies that they believe immoral because 
one party rather than another won an election, and because democratic freedoms and 
equality require respect for reasonable differences of conscience.   Hence, those who 
believe that the Catholic Church’s position on contraception and abortion is responsible 
for much unnecessary suffering and millions of wrongful deaths throughout the world 
must nonetheless pay taxes to protect its representatives, and must accept that their 
ideas can legitimately shape government aid in some circumstances. 9 
 
 Morally and politically, then, opposition to taxes that fund abortions are not the same 
as pacifist objections to military service.   Though both are concerned with the ethics of 
life and death, the rationale for tolerating conscientious objection in war reflects the idea 
that pacifism is incompatible with military service.  Likewise, the belief that abortion is 
murder is incompatible with carrying out, or seeking out, an abortion. But there is no 
necessary incompatibility between the belief that abortion is murder and the willingness 
to pay general taxes which fund it, or to obey laws that allow it.  This is not simply 
because the appropriate grounds of coercive legislation and the appropriate grounds of 
personal morality are not identical, but because acting as a killer, oneself, is very different 
from paying taxes which may, but need not, result in unjust killings. 10   Those who believe 
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that all abortions and all funding for abortion are unjust and unworthy of obedience, 
then, need to explain how their demands for special treatment are consistent with what 
John Rawls refers to as  ‘the democratic conception of society as a system of cooperation 
among equal persons’. (Rawls 1971, section 58)  
 
Still, the fact that the state has no duty to exempt people from taxes for abortion on 
conscientious grounds does not mean that it would be wrong to allow such exemptions, 
were these consistent with the rights of others.  The point applies also to those pacifists 
who have conscientious objections to paying taxes and to others with grave conscientious 
objections to particular government policies, and the taxes that sustain them.11  But that, 
of course, is the problem: for there is almost certainly no practicable way to craft such 
exemptions that is consistent with democratic rights and the demands of constitutional 
government, given that the existence of some, even many, conscientious objections to 
government policies are a predictable consequence of reasonable pluralism (Cohen 1993, 
281-5), and consistent with legitimate government and just policies.   The point, however,  
is that if it were possible to craft exemptions which treated citizens as equal, there would 
be no democratic objection to doing so, because democrats can wish to avoid forcing the 
conscience even of those whose beliefs are undemocratic, and who they believe to be 
unreasonable and unjust.   
 
Religious Organisations and the Provision of Public Services 
 
This argument has implications for the subsidy of religious institutions, not just for the 
taxation of individuals. If the parallel to pacifism provides no justification for exemptions 
from taxation, it illustrates the difficulty of state policies that require religious bodies to 
abide by religiously unacceptable norms simply because they are providing a public 
service.  All else equal, it seems to me, the state should not require Catholic adoption 
agencies to place children with homosexual couples simply because they are willing to 
serve non-Catholic couples looking to adopt.  All else equal, I believe, the state should not 
require Catholic hospitals to provide abortions or contraception, even if it serves a 
population that is not exclusively Catholic.   
 
Commented [A1]: You suggested that there is a typo and the 
final clause should read ‘where thèse are consistent..’. But there is 
no typo.  What is at issue is a subjunctive.  But if you prefer to have 
‘where these are’ that is fine by me.   
5 
 
Why?  Here, unlike the tax case, we have a direct parallel to the situation of the pacifist 
faced with the challenge of military service: namely, that what is being asked of such 
religious bodies is their direct, personal and active participation in a practice that they 
believe to be morally forbidden.  All else equal, we should not ask people to behave in 
such ways, whether their moral views are religiously based or not.  So all else equal, we 
should not require religious individuals or groups to behave in ways that they believe to 
be gravely wrong, simply because they are willing to offer important services to those 
who do not share their faith.  
 
But as we all know, all things are rarely equal.  In particular, I would argue, appropriate 
sensitivity to religious feelings depends very much on the importance of the service which 
is at issue, and on the alternatives which are available.   It is one thing to have many 
adoption services working in an area, one of which one happens to be Catholic and 
morally opposed to homosexuality, single parenting, divorce and the rest.  It is quite 
another to have the main adoption service in an area operating with what, for non-
believers, can only be described as set of morally unjustified beliefs that, in other 
contexts, would constitute illegal discrimination. 12  
 
Likewise, it is one thing to have such discrimination in the charitable distribution of 
sweets and other non-essential goods, and another to have it operate in the provision of 
goods which unquestionably constitute something of enormous importance to most 
people: the chance to raise children as one’s own, with the opportunities that this 
involves for serving, and sharing one’s life, with others.   Even if the interests of children 
provide the main considerations of justice in adoption, the interests of potential parents 
also have a role to play in determining what justice requires.  So unlike the sweet case, or 
the multiple adoption agency case, the state does have a reason – indeed, a duty – to 
ensure that parents who wish to adopt are not subject to discrimination that would 
otherwise be illegal.  
 
This means one of two things: either the state is entitled to remove any religious 
exemptions from antidiscrimination laws in cases where religious bodies are the dominant 
providers of an important public service, or the state must create and support 
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competition to that religious provider – perhaps using public money that had gone to that 
religious provider in order to do so.  No state has a duty to support the charitable 
activities of religious groups in preference to other groups, and no state has a duty to 
support the charitable activities of groups – whether religious or not – which engage in 
what would otherwise count as illegal discrimination.  
 
Indeed, there are good reasons to wonder how far states are entitled to use public 
money to facilitate discriminatory, though charitable, activities – at least on democratic 
principles. After all, there is no reason to suppose that the groups which are currently best 
placed to provide charitable services are in that position solely on merit.  That would be to 
ignore the importance of past activities which may well have included the suppression of 
competition and the intimidation of critics, as well as a willingness to benefit from the 
unjust exclusion of women and racial minorities.   
 
For example, Garrow’s study of the battles over the legalisation of contraception and 
abortion in New England paints a chilling picture of the willingness and ability of the 
Catholic Church to threaten and intimidate its members, in order to maintain its hold on 
public life (Garrow, 1998, ch.2 2) 13  So there is no particular reason why a state must 
continue to support the use of charitable groups in order to provide important public 
services.  As no religion has a claim to provide public services to others, despite the claims 
of the Catholic Archbishop of New York (Dolan, 2012),14 there is no threat to freedom of 
religion in requiring major providers of public services to abide by generally applicable 
laws, or to risk losing state funding for public service provision.    
 
What is true in the case of adoption agencies is true also in the case of hospitals.  
Where Catholic hospitals are merely one source of medical care amongst others, there 
would be no particular justification for requiring them to provide abortion services and 
counselling, since those in need of such services could readily seek them elsewhere. 
However, as providers of medical care, it would still be incumbent on them to tell those 
for whom contraception or abortion would be medically indicated that this is the case, 
and to inform patients of their legal rights to contraception and abortion, and of where 
they might find such services.15  Conscience, in other words, is no justification for failing to 
7 
 
provide adequate medical care, or to mislead people about legal rights and opportunities 
which are relevant to their ability to make informed decisions about their health.   But just 
as there is no reason why every hospital should provide the full panoply of medical 
services to the public, simply because it provides some or many of them, so there seems 
no reason why a religious hospital should be required to provide abortion and 
contraceptive services if other medical facilities are willing and able to do so.  
 
However, as with the adoption case so here:  where religious hospitals are the main 
source of medical care in their area, or the main source of care for those lacking expensive 
insurance, then the state has a compelling reason to ensure that the services cover 
contraception and adoption.  If a religious hospital is unwilling to fulfil those needs, there 
is no reason why the state should provide subsidies to it, or why it should not actively 
promote alternative providers of medical care in order to diminish the importance of the 
discriminatory provisions provided by the religious hospital.  Indeed, the state would have 
a duty to diminish the importance of the religious hospital, relative to the medical needs 
of the local population, in order to meet its own obligations of non-discriminatory care to 
its citizens.   
 
No one has a religious duty to be the main provider of important public services.  So 
there can be no religious-based objections to the state requiring religious bodies who are 
in a privileged position, relative to other public service providers, to provide non-
discriminatory service, or to accept the demotion of their importance in favour of those 
willing and able to do so.  As the relative capacity of different religious groups, different 
charitable groups, or different providers of public services has been shaped by 
undemocratic forms of power and privilege, democratic principles do not require us to 
treat existing levels of power and capacity as given, or to maintain existing levels of state 
support and funding.  To believe otherwise is to eviscerate democratic politics, and to 
require us to ratify, rather than overturn, injustices inherited from the past.     
 
Conclusion 
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In this article I have argued that opponents of abortion are not like pacifists because 
they seek to claim protections for their conscience while organising politically to deny 
those protections to others.  Nor can moral objections to taxation be compared to moral 
objections to fighting.  Finally, I have argued, while democratic principles tell against 
forcing small religious organisations to abide by antidiscrimination laws that violate their 
beliefs, the state has a duty to ensure that the powerful serve the public fairly.   
    
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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1 The quotation comes from ‘Religious Belief and Public Morality: A Catholic Governor’s 
Perspective’, Cuomo’s John A O’Brian Lecture at the University of Notre Dame’s 
Department of Theology’.  Available online at 
http://archives.nd.edu/research/texts/cuomo.htm  
2 The quotation comes from ‘Religious Belief and Public Morality: A Catholic Governor’s 
Perspective’, Cuomo’s John A O’Brian Lecture at the University of Notre Dame’s 
Department of Theology’.  Available online at 
http://archives.nd.edu/research/texts/cuomo.htm  
3 ‘Generally pacifism is thought to be a principled rejection of war and killing’, (Fiala  2010) 
at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pacifism .  
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4 But see  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tax_resistance and, in particular, 
http://www.warresisters.org/node/328  and Pennock 1998,  available online at 
https://www.msu.edu/~pennock5/research/papers/Pennock*Death_and_Taxes.pdf  
5 What is at issue is not just the protection of reasonable moral disagreement, but the 
protection of important life decisions on which reasonable people can profoundly disagree.  
6 As Cuomo put it, in his lecture at Notre Dame, ‘Must I, having heard the Pope renew the 
Church’s ban on birth control devices, veto the funding of contraceptive programs for non-
Catholics or dissenting Catholics in my State?  I accept the Church’s teaching on abortion.  
Must I insist you do?  By law? By denying you Medicaid funding? By a constitutional 
amendment?  If so, which one?’ Cuomo, 1984. 
7 See Lever 1997, ch. 4 for the importance of looking at arguments against abortion in the 
context of women’s interests in childbearing, and vice-versa.  available at www.alever.net  
8 Cuomo, again, is enlightening on these questions: cutting off Medicaid funding for legal 
abortion ‘would be nothing more than an attempt to do indirectly what the law says cannot be 
done directly; worse, it would do it in a way that  would burden only the already 
disadvantaged….Apart from the unevenness, there is a more basic question.  Medicaid is 
designed to deal with health and medical needs.  But the arguments for the cut-off of 
Medicaid abortion funds are not related to those needs.  They are moral arguments.  If we 
assume health and medical needs exist, our personal view of morality ought not to be 
considered a relevant basis for discrimination’. Cuomo 1984 
9 http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/24/us/politics/24obama.html?_r=0  but on the reasons 
why this policy effectively excludes rape victims from abortion treatment  see 
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/08/foreign-policy-akin-style-how-the-
us-denies-abortions-to-women-raped-in-war/261382/  and on its consequences for access to 
information on abortion see 
http://www.ipas.org/~/media/Files/Not%20Yet%20Rain%20Factsheets/NYR%20Helms.pdf.
ashx  
10 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/13/contraception-coverage-catholic-bishops-birth-
control-pacifists_n_1274392.html  Karl Meyer compares the very large amount of federal tax 
revenue which goes on war-related causes with the tiny amount which goes to abortion and 
says, ‘When it gets down to some kind of miniscule level, like one-thousandth of a 
percentage of federal income tax revenue going to something you disagree with, you might as 
well stop doing anything," Meyer said. "You can't go to a store and buy something without 
indirectly contributing to something bad." 
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11 While Pennock 1998 believes that general pacifism, and the refusal to pay all war-related 
taxes could form part of a Rawlsian overlapping consensus, he notes that Rawls himself 
appears to have thought – rightly, in my view – that general pacifism is a sectarian moral 
position: an ‘unworldly view bound to remain a sectarian doctrine’,   Rawls 1971, section 58.  
12http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2011/apr/26/catholic-adoption-agency-gay-lesbian  and 
http://www.pinknews.co.uk/2012/09/13/uk-catholic-adoption-charity-resumes-anti-gay-legal-
fight/ .   
13 We should also remember, as Cuomo said, that ‘Catholics…support the right to abortion in 
equal proportion to the rest of the population…collectively we Catholics apparently 
believe…and perhaps act…little differently from those who don’t share our commitment’.  
Cuomo, 1984) 
 
14 Dolan, 2012 available online at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203718504577178833194483196.html  
Dolan is both the Catholic Archbishop of New York and the President of the US Conference 
of Catholic Bishops.  He appears unwilling or unable to accept that there is no violation of 
religious freedom when the state asks voluntary agencies, including religious bodies, to abide 
by generally applicable laws in their treatment of non-members of their association, even 
when offered religious exemptions from those laws in the treatment of members of those 
associations themselves.  
15 Contrast the Supreme Court decision in Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) in which, 
over the bitter dissent of four of the Justices, the Majority held that the state could prohibit all 
medical facilities using State land or resources, from telling women that they have a right to 
abortion, or counselling them to seek an abortion.   
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